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Abstract
With increasing game size, a problem of computational complexity
arises. This is especially true in real world problems such as in social
systems, where there is a significant population of players involved in the
game, and the complexity problem is critical. Previous studies in algorithmic
game theory propose succinct games that enable small descriptions of payoff
matrices and reduction of complexities. However, some of the suggested
compromises lose generality with strict assumptions such as symmetries
in utility functions and cannot be applied to the full range of real world
problems that may be presented. Graphical games are relatively promising,
with a good balance between complexity and generality. However, they
assume a given graph structure of players’ interactions and cannot be
applied to games without such known graphs. This study proposes a
method to identify an interaction graph between players and subsequently
decompose games into smaller components by cutting out weak interactions
for the purpose of reducing complexity. At the beginning, players’ mutual
dependencies on their utilities are quantified as variance-covariance matrices
among players. Then, the interaction graphs among players are identified by
solving eigenvalue problems. Players’ interactions are further decomposed
into linear combinations of games. This helps to find a consistent
equilibrium, which is a Nash equilibrium specified by the decomposition,
with reduced computational complexity. Finally, experiments on simple
example games are shown to verify the proposed method.
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1 Introduction
Lately, the impact of sharing economies such as Uber and Airbnb have
started to replace the traditional economic systems. Consequently, a new
effective technology is required for designing social systems such as cities and
transportation. Since social systems consist of interactions between people and
can be modeled as games between them, game theory can be a fundamental tool
to analyze and optimize those systems. For instance, we modeled ride sharing
services as a game among people who share vehicles, and studied a coordination
mechanism to realize effective use of shared vehicles [1].
However, when the size of games increases, computational complexity also
increases. Generally speaking, a solution of a game such as Nash equilibrium or
social optimum is denoted as a certain strategy profile that is a combination of all
players’ choices. Then, the computational complexity of a game depends on the
size of the search space of solutions which increases exponentially according to
the number of players. Especially in games of social systems, the population of
involved players is usually huge, and the complexity problem is critical.
This study proposes a technique that reduces the size of games and accordingly
their computational complexity, by decomposing large games into smaller
components.
1.1 Related work
The complexity problem in game theory has been studied for years, and
the accumulation of knowledge is systematized as one of the main topics of
“Algorithmic Game Theory" [2]. Roughly speaking, the computational complexity
theory in algorithmic game theory has two subfields, namely the theory of 2 players
and the theory of N(> 2) players. The latter is the focus of this study. In games of
N players, where the number of choices of each player is A, the size of the payoff
matrix is O(NAN ). Hence, it is difficult to give a full description of such a payoff
matrix in large games that have bigNs. Thus, the computational complexity theory
only focuses on succinct games that can avoid full descriptions of payoff matrices
and allow brief representations of large games. The following are major succinct
games:
• Games exploiting independencies between players
– Graphical games. These are games that have graphical descriptions
of dependencies between players’ utilities [3]. These allow a full
description of all players’ utilities with only payoff matrices among
players that have mutual interactions.
– Polymatrix games. These are games that decompose the description of
N -player utilities into the sums of utilities of 2-player games [4].
– Sparse games. These are games with most of the elements of the payoff
matrices having zero values [5].
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• Games exploiting symmetries among players
– Symmetric games. These are games where all players have the same
utility function [6].
– Congestion games. These are games where the utility of a player’s
choice depends only on the number of players selecting that choice [7].
– Local effect games. This is a generalization of congestion games. The
utility of a player depends on the number of players with the same
choice and also on the number of players with other choices [8].
These succinct games allow compact representation of games. Besides, some
of the games provide efficient algorithms that calculate equilibria. Meanwhile,
succinct games have the drawback of spoiling generality. Succinct games cannot
describe many real world problems. For example, only limited problems can satisfy
the assumption of symmetric games that all players have the same utility function.
Congestion games can model congestions, which are general phenomena in the real
world. However, they cannot model complex problems where supplies of resources
can change according to players’ choices such as car-sharing or ride-sharing [1].
In addition, simplifying the description of payoff matrices by succinct games
does not mean reduction of computational complexity in calculating game
solutions. For example, congestion games provide compact descriptions of utility
functions which only depend on the number of players. However, ifN players have
a common subset of choices of size A, then the size of the solution space becomes
at least O(AN ) because all of the N players interact with each other. Here, the
problem of computational complexity in equilibrium calculation is evident.
It is known that the complexity of calculating Nash equilibrium is
PPAD-complete, which means that there is no known general polynomial-time
algorithm [9]. However, previous works have been trying to propose relatively
efficient algorithms. The Lemke-Howson algorithm formulates the calculation
of Nash equilibrium of two players as a linear complementary problem [10]. In
general cases of more than two players, the problem becomes multilinear and
then more complex [11, 12]. In the case of polymatrix games, the problem of
more than two players maintains linearity, but diminishes generality. They are all
non-polynomial problems, which then need techniques to tackle large games.
Some works propose scalable algorithms for equilibrium computation by
utilizing specific structures of games. Abstraction of games is a technique to reduce
the size of the games and their complexity of equilibrium computation [13]. The
original large game is converted into a coarse smaller game by grouping some
elements of games such as types and actions of the players or stages of the games.
However, an assumption on partial ordering of player types must be satisfied to
guarantee the equivalence of equilibria between original and abstracted games. In
case of games with temporal structures, the sequence form representation is applied
to calculate equilibrium of two players efficiently by formulating linear programs
or linear complementary problems [14]. While the sequence form assumes perfect
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recall of players, a modeling technique of player strategies with Markov Decision
Processes (MDPs) enables the relaxation of the assumption [15, 16]. Its temporal
scalability may possibly reduce the complexity further in combination with the
population scalability of our proposed method.
In the meantime, graphical games keep a good balance between reduction of
complexity and generality of the model [3] and can possibly be applied to many
real world problems. Graphical games, as the name suggests, describe the structure
of a game in a directed graph. Nodes of a graph represent players, and the node
of one player has an edge connected to another player when the utility of the
destination player is dependent on the choice of the origin player. In this paper,
we call the graph an interaction graph of the game. Therefore, the game can be
described with small payoff matrices including only neighbor players instead of
the full size payoff matrix of N players (Figure 1). Directions of edges are omitted
in figures if both directions exist. Graphical games also provide algorithms for
equilibrium calculations using similar algorithms as information propagation in
graphs which are well studied in the machine learning field. However, graphical
games assume a given graph structure and cannot be applied to large complex
games if the interactions of players are unknown.
Large complex games are intractable in both representation of payoff matrices
and computational complexity of solutions. However, many real world problems
do not involve interactions of all players, but rather a set of interactions between
a small group of players, as in graphical games. If the interactions of players
can be detected automatically and large complex games can be decomposed into
a set of small games, the representation of payoff matrices can be simple, and
computational complexity can be reduced.
Figure 1: Graphical game
1.2 Purpose of the study
The purpose of this work is to decompose large complex games into sets of small
games for reduction of computational complexity. We propose a method that
covers a wide range of game classes.
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2 Approach
2.1 Problem of game decomposition
In this section, we formulate our problem of decomposing games. Our basic
assumption is that not all players interact with each other, and the utility of a
player depends on choices of only a limited number of players. Generally, each
player has his own utility function and the set of players who have influence on the
utility function is different for each player. Therefore, decomposition of a game
means identifying the limited number of players who have influence on the utility
function of each player.
A problem has an input game G =< N ,A,u > to be decomposed. N =
{1, ..., N} is a set of players, andAi is the set of choices of player i ∈ N . ai ∈ Ai
is a choice of player i. A = ×
i∈N
Ai is a set of combinations of all players’ choices.
a = (a1, ..., aN ) ∈ A is a combination of all players’ choices called a strategy
profile. a−i denotes a strategy profile of all players except for i.
ui : A → R is the utility function of player i and u = (u1, ..., uN ) is the utility
vector function of all players. We use ui(ai,a−i) to denote ui(a) when it is more
convenient. The shape of u is arbitrary, but its representation must be succinct
because the input game G is large. We assume that it is possible to calculate the
utility of a player u(a) with a given profile a, but interaction graphs are not given
as in graphical games. Hence, a search of the whole profile space A is necessary
to calculate a solution of G, and it is computationally intractable. This is because
the utility function ui(a) takes a strategy profile of all players as input. Instead,
we should identify a limited number of players who have influence on ui to reduce
complexity.
Definition 1 (Partial profile). Given a subset of players N ′ ⊂ N , aN ′ =
(..., a(N ′,i), ...) ∈ AN ′ is a partial profile of a ∈ A iff AN ′ = ×
i∈N ′
Ai and
a(N ′,i) = ai, ∀i ∈ N ′. This is denoted as aN ′ ⊂ a for simplicity.
Definition 2 (Influencer). Player j is an influencer of player i iff ui depends on j’s
choice. The set of influencers for player i is denoted as N i. We denote as follows
for simplicity:
ui(a) = ui(aN i). (1)
Definition 3 (Partial game). Given a subset of players Nk ⊂ N , Gk =<
Nk,ANk ,uk > is a partial game of G =< N ,A,u > iff
uk = (..., u(k,i), ...)i∈Nk ,
u(k,i)(aNk) = ui(aNk), ∀i ∈ Nk,∀aNk ∈ ANk .
(2)
Now decomposition of game G is defined as follows.
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Definition 4 (Decomposed games). Partial games {Gk =< Nk,ANk ,uk > |k ∈
K = {1, ...,K}} are a decomposition of G =< N ,A,u > iff
N = ∪
k∈K
Nk. (3)
In reverse, the game G is the combined game of {Gk}.
The goal of the game decomposition problem is to identify influencers N i for
all players and subsequently decompose the input game G if possible. How can
this be solved?
2.2 Overview of approach
Our approach has two steps. The first step is finding interactions among players
and estimating influencers N i for all players. This is equivalent to estimating
the interaction graph of the game. Our proposed method achieves this first step
by constructing variance-covariance matrices among players. Once the matrix of
player i is obtained, the influencers N i are estimated by solving the eigenvalue
problem.
After identifying the graph of the game, the second step further decomposes
them if possible. This is also done two ways. One way is approximate cutting.
Since our approach can reveal the relative strength of interactions between players,
weak interactions can be cut to make smaller games. The other way is division of
a player. This way decomposes the utility function ui into a linear combination
of two small utility functions of player i. The following sections describe this in
further detail.
2.3 Principle of detecting interactions between players
Figure 2 shows simple 2-player games and describes the principle of how our
approach detects interactions between players. There are two payoff matrices
of 2 players who have choices of {aR, aL}. The left one shows a case where 2
players have interactions with each other, and the right one shows a case without
any interactions between players. In the left case, the payoff of the row player
changes according to the choice of the column player. Meanwhile in the right
case, the payoff of the row player does not depend on the choice of the column
player. Therefore, as shown in the bottom of the figure, the change in payoff when
the opponent changes the choice represents the strength of the influence of the
opponent’s actions on the payoff.
2.4 Interaction matrix between players
In this section, we describe how to detect interactions between N players, whereas
the last section describes 2-player cases. The proposed method makes concrete the
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Figure 2: Principle of detecting interactions
interactions between N players on the utility of player i into a variance-covariance
matrix Ci ∈ RN×N that we call the interaction matrix of player i.
The procedure INTERACTIONMATRIX given in Algorithm 1 computes the
matrix. A game instance G =< N ,A,u > is given as the input, but the
interactions among players are unknown. A difference of payoff ∆ui is calculated
by changing the choice of player j between two strategy profiles a, b (line 9),
as illustrated in Figure 3. The procedure repeats this step to collect samples of all
players. Then the output Ci has the information of the interactions between players
on the utility of player i. The size of data needed to calculate Ci for all players is
at most O(LN2).
Figure 3: Sampling data of utility differences
2.5 Estimation of influencers
The proposed method identifies influencersN i in Definition 2 out of all playersN
based on the interaction matrix Ci and linear algebra. At first, all players N are
clustered into groups k ∈ Ki = {1, ...,Ki} by solving the following eigenvalue
problem.
Civk = λkvk. (4)
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Algorithm 1 Interaction matrix
Input: A game instance G =< N ,A,u >; A player index i; Number of samples
for each player L
Output: An interaction matrix Ci
1: procedure INTERACTIONMATRIX(G, i)
2: Initialize Xi ∈ RNL×N as a zero matrix.
3: k = 0.
4: for j ∈ N
5: for l = 1 to L
6: Choose a ∈ A randomly.
7: b = a.
8: Update bj ∈ Aj \ {aj} randomly.
9: ∆ui = ui(b)− ui(a).
10: Xi[k][j] = ∆ui.
11: k = k + 1.
12: Compute X¯i ∈ RNL×N with identical rows which are the average of Xi
along rows.
13: Ci = (Xi − X¯i)T (Xi − X¯i)/(NL− 1).
14: return Ci
We consider only nontrivial solutions that have λk > 0. An eigenvector vk ∈
[−1, 1]N represents a group of players who have influence on the utility of player i.
If player j is an influencer of player i, the element j of vk has a non-zero value. The
elements of players who are not influencers have all zero values. An eigenvalue λk
represents the relative strength of influence of players in vk. Thus, all influencers
N i are identified by checking λk and vk. Once N i are identified for all players
i ∈ N , they contain enough information to draw the interaction graph of the game.
The computational complexity is now reduced because the calculation of utility
ui(a
i) depends only on the profile of influencers ai.
2.6 Approximate cut of game
The eigenvalues and eigenvectors computed in the last section contain more
information than the interaction graph of the game by itself. Since they have
information on the relative strengths of interactions between players, weak
interactions in the game can be identified by setting thresholds of eigenvalues
and eigenvectors. Hence, it is possible to decompose the game approximately by
cutting out the weak connection in the interaction graph (Figure 4). An example is
shown in Section 3.1.
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Figure 4: Cut of a game
2.7 Division of players in linear combinations of games
Figure 5 shows another decomposition of the same game in Figure 4. Different
from Figure 4, player 1 belongs to both decomposed games. Even though it
changes the interaction graph and properties of the game, this decomposition is
useful for reducing certain types of complexities of the original game. This section
describes a case of equilibrium computations.
Figure 5: Division of a player
Definition 5 (Nash satisfaction). Let Gk =< Nk,ANk ,uk > denote a partial
game of G =< N ,A,u >. A strategy profile a ∈ A satisfies Gk iff a∗Nk ⊂ a is a
Nash equilibrium of Gk.
Definition 6 (Linear decomposition of game). Let {Gk =< Nk,ANk ,uk >}
denote a decomposition of G =< N ,A,u >. {Gk} is a linear decomposition
of G iff
u(a) =
∑
k∈K
bkuk(aNk), (5)
where bk is a constant. In reverse, G is a linear combination of {Gk}.
The following theorem helps to find a Nash equilibrium of combined games by
finding Nash equilibria of linearly decomposed games.
Theorem 1. Let {Gk} denote a linear decomposition of G with bk ≥ 0,∀k ∈ K. If
a profile a satisfies all {Gk}, a is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof. If a = (a1, ..., aN ) satisfies all {Gk}, the following conditions of Nash
equilibrium are satisfied:
ai = arg max
a′i∈Ai
u(k,i)(a
′
i,a(Nk,−i)),∀k ∈ K,∀i ∈ Nk. (6)
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Since a maximizes uk for all k ∈ K, a also maximizes their positively weighted
sum u in (5) as follows
ai = arg max
a′i∈Ai
ui(a
′
i,a−i), ∀i ∈ N (7)
which means that a is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Now a decomposition can specify a Nash equilibrium that is defined as follows:
Definition 7 (Consistent equilibrium). Let {Gk} denote a decomposition of G. A
Nash equilibrium a∗ ∈ A of G is a consistent equilibrium of {Gk} iff a∗ satisfies
all {Gk}.
Hence, if we decompose a game linearly as (5), it can help to find a consistent
equilibrium of the original combined game in accordance with Theorem 1. Since
the number of players decreases in each decomposed game, the complexity
required to find equilibria is also reduced. This approach is similar to the
polymatrix games, but can cover a broader class of games. An example is shown
in Section 3.2.
3 Examples
3.1 Example of identifying an interaction graph
In this section, the method proposed in Section 2 is verified to see if it can identify
the interaction graph of an input game G =< N ,A,u >. Figure 6 shows the true
interaction graph of G which is unknown to the proposed method. The verification
compared the estimation of the proposed method with the true graph. N includes
24 players and a choice of each player i ∈ N is binary Ai = {0, 1}. The
player i’s utility function ui(a) is generated by uniform random sampling of a
value from integers {0, ..., 9} for all partial profiles of influencers aN i ∈ AN i .
If the interaction graph is unknown, the complexity of equilibrium computation is
|A| = 224.
According to the method in Section 2.4, L = 10 sample data are collected for
each player i and then the interaction matrix Ci and eigenvectors vk, k ∈ Ki =
{1, ...,Ki} are calculated. Subsequently, the interaction graph can be estimated by
regarding player j who has |vk,j | > 0 in any of theKi eigenvectors as an influencer
of player i. The proposed method correctly estimated the true interaction graph as
in Figure 6. Additionally for example, the interaction matrix of player 10 has three
eigenvectors which correspond to player 0, 10 and 20 respectively, who are all
influencers of player 10 (Figure 7).
The size of sample data required for this estimation is 10 ∗ 242 which is
smaller than the complexity without estimation 224. In addition, the input game
is decomposed into two partial games including 12 players each which reduces the
complexity of equilibrium computation into 212 at most. Furthermore, the biggest
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groups of players interacting with each other are two groups that have 5 players
including players 0 and 23 respectively, because of which an efficient computation
can be expected by applying the algorithm of graphical games.
Moreover, the eigenvalues λk and eigenvectors vk include more detailed
information on the relative strengths of the interactions. According to the method
in Section 2.6, this information can be used for further approximate decomposition
of the game. Figure 8 shows the result of decomposition that is a graph including
only strong interactions of λk > 0.29, |vk,j | > 0.05. The arrows in the figure
show the cut edges. As a result, the game is decomposed into 4 small games which
realizes further improvement in computation efficiency.
Figure 6: True interaction graph
Figure 7: eigenvectors of player 10
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Figure 8: Approximate graph with only strong interactions
3.2 Example of linear decomposition
In this section, an example is shown to describe how a linear decomposition helps
to find a consistent equilibrium. The input game G =< {1, 2, 3},A,u > has a
interaction graph similar to left one in Figure 5. The game is a linear combination
of two partial games G2 =< {1, 2},A2,u2 > and G3 =< {1, 3},A3,u3 >. The
payoff matrices u2 and u3 are generated in a similar way as in the last section and
are shown in Figure 9. The utility function of G is a linear combination u(a) =
u2(a) + u3(a). Though u(a) is known input, this decomposition is unknown to
the proposed method.
Now let’s consider the problem of finding the Nash equilibria of G. Actually,
this game has three Nash equilibria which are {(0, 2, 0), (0, 2, 1), (2, 0, 0)}. If the
true decomposed payoff matrices in Figure 9 are unknown, finding those equilibria
requires searching the whole space of strategy profile A, which has size 33 = 27.
However, the proposed method in Section 2.7 enables finding an equilibrium with
smaller complexity.
The method requires computing a linear decomposition of G which is {G′2,G′3}.
This is actually computing a decomposition of utility u(a) = u′2(a) + u′3(a)
without knowing the true decomposition in Figure 9. The way to decompose the
utility u(a) has a degree of freedom.
Figure 10 shows one of the possible decompositions. The Nash equilibria
of the decomposed games {G′2,G′3} are {(0, 2), (2, 0)} and {(2, 0)}, respectively.
In this case, a profile (2, 0, 0) satisfies both decomposed games and then is a
consistent equilibrium of the input game G and is one of the Nash equilibria. Since
the computation required to find this consistent equilibrium is calculating Nash
equilibria of decomposed games, the complexity is 2 ∗ 32 = 18, which is smaller
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than the original complexity of 33 = 27.
A consistent equilibrium requires a proper linear decomposition. Figure 11
shows another decomposition of the input game. The Nash equilibria of the
decomposed games {G′2,G′3} are {(0, 2)} and {(2, 0), (2, 2)} respectively. In this
case, no profile of G satisfies both decomposed games and thus it fails to find the
consistent equilibrium.
Figure 9: True payoff matrices of input games
Figure 10: Decomposition with consistent equilibrium
Figure 11: Decomposition without consistent equilibrium
4 Conclusion
For the purpose of reducing computational complexity of large complex games,
this study proposes a method to identify an interaction graph of the input
game by constructing an interaction matrix between players and solving its
eigenvalue problem. Additionally, a technique of linear decomposition of games is
proposed to find consistent equilibria, which are Nash equilibria specified by the
decomposition, with reduced computational complexity.
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The proposed method is applicable to a wide range of game classes described
with utility functions. Real world problems in the field of city planning,
transportation, environment, and economics are generally modeled as interactions
between people, so the applications of the proposed method are full of variety.
Also, since the proposal is a simple method that decomposes large games into
smaller ones, it can be combined with other methods that also reduce computational
complexity.
Future studies include validation with real world problems and effective
computation of each game decomposed by the proposed method. This study shows
a method for connecting game theory with linear algebra. Since linear algebra has
been applied to variety of areas and has many useful tools, the connection has the
potential to evolve game theory further.
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